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SUBJECT: UNGA FOURTH COMMITTEE: PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS

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¶1. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: This year's annual general debate on peacekeeping in the Fourth Committee (special political and decolonization), from October 23 - 29, was largely uneventful, which is a positive step forward from the past few years' negative atmosphere and polemical divides between North and South. Countries from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the European Union (EU) expressed acquiescence if not support for the general thrust of the "New Horizon" reform agenda proposed by the Heads of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS), U/SYG Alain LeRoy and U/SYG Susana Malcorra, respectively. Major troop contributing countries (TCCs), which in years past used the occasion to harangue the Security Council and the Secretariat for failing to heed their concerns, this year actually acknowledged steps by the Council and the U.S. to reach out to them. They urged the Security Council and the Secretariat to continue in that direction, as the "trilateral" consultations (between the Security Council, the Secretariat and TCCs) remained among their highest concerns. The NAM, in its statement, also formally commended the U.S. for meeting its financial obligations for peacekeeping.

¶2. Notwithstanding, several delegations from the South laid down clear markers that they were not ready to give the Secretariat a blank check on the reform proposals to be formally considered in the Feb-March 2010 session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). They were expecting to receive and review very carefully the details of any proposals for peacekeeping reform, particularly on the protection of civilians and robust peacekeeping. Major financial contributors from the developed countries gave similar indications with respect to the field support strategy. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

DPKO and DFS presentations

¶3. U/SYG Le Roy offered impressions from his visits to the field during his first year in office and outlined next steps in the implementation of the DPKO/DFS non-paper issued in July, entitled "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping Operations." He foresaw four main themes addressed in "New Horizon" to be developed and

presented to the membership for consideration at the Feb-March 2010 session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). First, there was a need to develop policy guidance on key aspects of modern-day peacekeeping, notably to protect civilians, conduct "robust peacekeeping" and undertake critical peace-building activities. Second, new efforts would be required to provide the missions with the capabilities needed to do the job, including the necessary performance standards, training, equipment, and specialized units. Third, stronger UN field support arrangements (e.g. personnel, finance, budgeting, procurement, logistics, information and communications technology) would need to be put in place. And fourth, it was essential to ensure more consultative and effective arrangements for mission planning and oversight.

¶4. Elaborating on the field support strategy, U/SYG Malcorra said she was focused on getting the right staff on board, securing sufficient funding, and providing the necessary equipment and logistical services in the field as quickly as possible. A more responsive model of field support was required not only for the 15 peacekeeping missions run by DPKO, but another 13 special political missions, largely run by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the AU-led mission in Somalia (AMISOM). She envisaged moving from a mission-centric approach to a "global and integrated delivery system." This new strategy would need to balance the operational risk and opportunity costs of deployment delays with the financial risk inherent in further delegation and decentralization of authority to the field. The new support strategy would ultimately seek to be more responsive to field

personnel's needs and security considerations; and more cognizant of the economic and environmental impact of large-scale deployments on the local communities.

Blocks statements about core issues

¶5. The Swedish Representative, speaking for the European Union, expressed concurrence with the priorities outlined by U/SYG LeRoy, urged the Secretariat to implement those of New Horizon's recommendations within its purview and signaled readiness to consider others requiring legislative approval. Sweden, on behalf of EU, "encouraged the Security Council and the Secretariat to further develop consultation procedures, in accordance with the PRST of 5 August 2009, including when deciding on new peacekeeping mandates." It also called for attention on: civilian peace-building capacities; elaboration of strategic direction for UN policing operations; implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security; the socio-economic impact of peacekeeping; the command and control arrangements of peacekeeping operations; and cooperation with and capacity-building of regional organizations. Of note, the EU indicated that the DFS mid-point non-paper on the field support strategy provided a "promising basis for discussion," while concurrently making clear that "further discussions with Member States are needed to work out details of the proposed strategy."

¶6. Speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Moroccan representative, while reaffirming long-standing NAM positions (e.g. insistence on adherence to principles of consent of the parties, non-use of force in self-defense, impartiality, respect for sovereignty, political independence), made several noteworthy general policy points. First, the NAM expressed appreciation for the UNSC's efforts to deepen consultation with TCCs, as evidenced by the work of the UNSC working group on peacekeeping and the PRST of August 5, 2009. Additionally, it called for "streamlining the various Member State initiatives" on peacekeeping and "expressed its readiness" as a major partner to engage in the debate over the "New Horizon" non-paper, calling for increased focus on the operational aspects, especially in the military real. NAM expected the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to "lay down action orientated recommendations" related thereto, as well as to engage in discussions on the DFS Support Strategy. It reaffirmed the

Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operation's position on protection of civilians in peacekeeping, notably that it is a primary responsibility of the Host Country, and requires an integrated and comprehensive approach, timely provision of adequate resources, logistical support and training, as well as clearly defined and achievable mandates. NAM urged caution in invoking Chapter VII in peacekeeping contexts and called for future debate on "robust peacekeeping" to be "restricted to the operational and tactical level."

¶7. The NAM continued its policy points calling for greater engagement from the Secretariat, to support the capacity building activities of the regional and national training centers of TCC. It called for continuing efforts to strengthen African Peacekeeping capabilities, including implementation of the Joint Action Plan for UN support to African peacekeeping, and enhanced partnership between the UN and AU. It reiterated the enhancement of the safety and security of peacekeepers as a top priority. Lastly, turning to financial matters, the "NAM commend(ed) the steps taken by the Government of the United States in payment of their arrears", while concurrently proposing that the C-34 hold informal consultations on measures to ensure rapid processing and payment of reimbursements to TCCs.

¶8. Mexico on behalf of the Rio group, echoed NAM calls for strengthened partnership among all major stakeholders, greater consultation with and timely reimbursement of TCCs, continued focus on training (including translation of all training materials in Spanish and Portuguese) and readiness

to discuss the New Horizon non-paper in the C-34. Unlike the NAM, however, the Rio Group expressly mentioned the importance of adhering to the Zero Tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. It welcomed new provisions on SEA in the model Memorandum of Understanding as a substantial improvement. It looked forward to considering relevant aspects of the SYG's report on assistance to victims of SEA (A/64/176) and took note of the issuance in 2009 of a victim's assistance guide. The Rio group also expressly supported the efforts of MINUSTAH and called for attention to the socio-economic and development-related aspects of its mandate, in addition those pertaining to security.

¶9. Thailand, speaking on behalf of countries from ASEAN, was more forward leaning on evolutions in modern-day peacekeeping. It stressed that "complex and integrated mandates, such as the protection of civilians and human rights protection, will certainly need clear guidelines from the Secretariat while mandates related to security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and rule of law will need both operational guidelines and strategic guidance." Thailand mentioned that ASEAN countries now had close to 3,500 troops and police serving in UN peacekeeping. The ASEAN member states, as they "move towards becoming one community by 2015," were "looking at the possibility of establishing a network among the existing peacekeeping centers of ASEAN Member States to conduct joint planning, training and sharing of experiences, as envisaged in the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint."

¶10. Canada, speaking on behalf of Australia and New Zealand (CANZ), made one of the longest statements, laying down several markers for the forthcoming session of the C-34. It was "encouraged by the release" of New Horizon, "whose underlying principles and recommendations merit broad substantive discussion amongst the Member States" CANZ welcomed the call for strengthened partnership among all key stakeholders and outreach to TCCs. CANZ echoed calls for clear and achievable peacekeeping mandates, adding that "ensuring missions are adequately resourced for success" should be "an essential precursor for any deployment," while "not allowing potential limitations in available forces to prejudge the feasibility of missions for which there is a clearly identified need." It stressed that mandates should include benchmarks for evaluating progress that can assist, along with Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs), decisions about re-shaping or ending deployments. CANZ supported U/SYG

LeRoy's view that all concerned needed urgently to come to a shared understanding of the key tasks, definitions and operational requirements of modern peacekeeping, especially for robust peacekeeping, protection of civilians and peacebuilding. In this regard, CANZ remained interested in the Secretariat's analysis and recommendations on the management and use of military utility helicopters in peacekeeping missions. It stressed the importance of developing operational guidelines and training standards for civilian protection mandates, and looked forward to the independently commissioned DPKO-OCHA study on protection of civilians. CANZ believed it essential to dedicate equal attention to the political, economic and peace-building requirements in peacekeeping contexts.

¶11. CANZ welcomed the efforts of the Peace-building Commission and encouraged the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) to "be engaged at an early stage in the development strategies for sequencing, resourcing and implementing mandated early safety and security stability tasks, as requested by the Special Committee in March 2009." CANZ commended AU efforts in Somalia and pledged its commitment to supporting the development of the peacekeeping capacities of regional organizations. It called on the UN to support regional efforts and demonstrate "leadership in developing the guidance necessary to ensure commonality of standards and procedures." CANZ spoke at length about the importance of greater attention to policing issues and coordination with Police-Contributing Countries. It stressed the need for

further development of policies, doctrine, operating guidelines, recruiting and evaluation criteria, as well as common pre-deployment training. It "welcomed the direction proposed by the DFS mid-point paper on a new field support strategy" and was eager for detailed discussion of the proposals and "the development of an implementation plan that sees a phased approach of agreed initiatives by priority." Finally, CANZ looked forward to continued discussions on the implementation of strengthening the Office of Military Affairs/DPKO, Secretariat plans for managing surge and stand-up capacity requirements, further development of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) and improvements to the Human Resources and recruitment systems.

P-5 and large donor statements about core issues

¶12. The U.S. took the occasion to mention President Obama's September 23 meeting with the leaders of top TCCs as indication of our commitment to strengthening partnerships among all key peacekeeping stakeholders. The U.S. had listened intently to the TCCs' concerns and shared many of them. The U.S. believed that there are several major challenges facing UN peacekeeping. First, a number of peacekeeping missions are operating in the midst of faltering peace processes, requiring political support. Peacekeeping operations must be accompanied by-and not be a substitute-for critical peace-making efforts. Second, peacekeeping mandates and means must be better aligned. Missions face critical shortfalls, including well-trained and well-equipped troops, police and hospitals, engineers, transport and aviation units. Third, missions must be adequately staffed and resourced to effectively carry out mandates to protect civilians from physical violence, including sexual and gender-based violence. Fourth, UN mission planning and support arrangements must be improved to reduce deployment delays, better respond to peacekeepers' needs on the ground, and ensure cost-effectiveness and efficiencies. Fifth, more attention must be given to the peace-building and development priorities, which should accompany the peacekeeping work, particularly in reform of the criminal justice and security sectors. Finally, mission strategies must have the flexibility to adapt to realities on the ground, and should be geared towards retaining the support of the host population in carrying out its mandate.

¶13. The U.S. supported the call of LeRoy and Malcorra, on follow-up to New Horizon, for priority attention to the

specialized military and police capabilities, operational standards, practical guidance and training, field support arrangements and oversight mechanisms needed to successfully carry out the essential tasks demanded of modern UN peacekeeping. These tasks currently often include protection of civilians, robust peacekeeping and peace-building. It was important to build a shared understanding among Member States and the Secretariat of what is meant by these terms and what is required to 'operationalize' them in peacekeeping contexts.

¶14. China stated that there had been numerous attempts at institutional reform of peacekeeping operations. It hoped that the current reforms would include clear priorities for the secretariat especially in the areas of exit strategies. It also called on peacekeeping missions to emphasize capacity-building to ensure that missions did not need to return to a country. China also noted that discussions should be premised on primary responsibility of countries concerned and the respect for their sovereignty. It called on more efficient use of resources during the economic crisis.

¶15. Russia stated that peacekeepers were tasked with increasingly complex tasks including security sector reform, disarmament, reintegration and soci-economic transformation. It noted that peacekeeping operations need to be enhanced to deal with these mandates. Russia believes that the concept of "robust peacekeeping" must be studied and that protection of civilians is the responsibility of the governments involved in the conflict. It stated that representatives of TCCs should play a more active role in decisions and that the number of troop contributing countries should be expanded.

¶16. Japan welcomed the emphasis in "New Horizon" on making sure peacekeeping operations are established "in the context of the broader political process and should have mandates consistent with the objectives of the missions and the available resources." It was important to make a clear distinction between what can be achieved by deploying a UN PKO and what could not. Japan thought it "indispensable for peacekeeping missions to set benchmarks and have adequate planning toward mission objectives." It appreciated that New Horizon called for more quality-over-quantity and sought to achieve more effective and efficient operations within limited resources. "In that context, (Japan) support(ed) the Secretariat's approach to engage Member States to review the Support Strategy."

¶17. Japan observed that many of the issues TCCs and Council members has raised in the UNSC Working Group on Peacekeeping, which it has chaired since January 2009, coincided with those in New Horizon: protection of civilians; capacity-building of troops; linkages with peace-building; and establishing partnerships for mandate implementation. It sought continuing discussions on these issues in the C-34, as well as the UNSC Working Group. It signaled out protection of civilians as one of the most important but difficult mandates assigned to missions. As had been observed in Sudan and DRC, "it is nearly impossible to cover completely such vast areas with limited personnel." Accordingly, it was important to look at the mobility of units, strengthened communications with host populations, creative measures such as instituted in MONUC (e.g. Joint Protection Teams) and greater attention to security sector reform and building rule of law capacities in the host government. Particularly close coordination was needed between the UNSC, TCCs and the Secretariat in this area. Japan envisaged that the WG would begin discussing strengthening cooperation with TCCs in November. There were numerous ideas out there already, including detailed measures agreed in UNSCR 1353(2001). The challenge was now to implement them.

TCC statements about core issues

¶18. Pakistan aligned itself with the NAM statement and

pointed out that it is now the number one contributor, with nearly 11,000 personnel accounting for 10 percent of all blue helmets in the world. It offered four general policy points. First, it welcomed President Obama's initiative to convene a "TCC Summit" in September. Second, it stressed the unique nature of UN peacekeeping, based on the guiding principles of the UN charter. It was essential not to confuse it with other kinds of peace operations led by non-UN entities.

Third, the missions needed to be provided with clear, realistic and achievable mandates. This required "a high degree of coherence" between the decision-makers in the UNSC who write the mandates, and the TCCs who are implementers on the ground. Fourth, UN peacekeeping missions must be provided with adequate resources. In that connection, Pakistan valued the comment of Malcorra and DFS to get the right staff on board, secure sufficient funding and provide necessary equipment and logistical services in the field.

Finally, the increased focus on peacekeeping needed to be accompanied by equal efforts at conflict prevention, resolution, and post-conflict peace-building. In that context, Pakistan believed the Secretary-General's report of June 2009 on Peace-building provided "a solid foundation to move forward."

¶19. Bangladesh associated itself with the NAM statement and pointed out that it now had 10,000 peacekeeping deployed in 14 missions (making it the number 2 contributor) Since 1988,

Bangladesh had lost 100 peacekeepers while serving in 32 missions. Bangladesh echoed the sentiment of others about the need for missions to be provided with the necessary political support and resources. It also strongly echoed the importance of strengthened partnership among the UNSC, TCCs and the Secretariat. Bangladesh added that "we must appreciate the recent initiative made by President Barak Obama convening a high level meeting with TCCs." One of the key concerns TCCs faced was with respect to delays in reimbursements. As of September 2009, Bangladesh was still owed \$166 million for reimbursement of troops and contingent-owned equipment.

¶20. India, now the third largest contributor to UN peacekeeping, aligned itself with the NAM. It pointed out that Indian had contributed more than 100,000 peacekeepers to 40 UN operations since 1956. India took note, "with appreciation," of the efforts of the UK and France to examine the current state of peacekeeping. It also "took note" of the efforts of the UNSC WG and the Secretariat's New Horizon project. For India, the primary challenge facing peacekeeping and its major concern pertained to peacekeeping mandates. They were too broad and too ambitious. There was "very little correlation with the ability of the organization to deliver." Unrealistic mandates had led to situations where mission personnel were forced to ask national contingents to undertake tasks and utilized CCOE in a manner that was inconsistent with the legal framework under which they were deployed. This gap would only be narrowed with greater involvement in the mandate formulation process of those contributing manpower and resources to the PKOs. The most recently UNSC PRST on Peacekeeping, committing as it did to enhanced consultation with TCCs and the Secretariat, was therefore a welcome step in the right direction.

¶21. India hoped DPKO would similarly involve developing countries more in the generation of doctrine, benchmarks and standards for the implementation of police and rule of law mandates. There was also a need to engage countries that had undergone "successful post-colonial nation-building exercises" in the development of governance capacities in countries now hosting PKOs. Finally, India was concerned that DFS needed "far greater internal coordination and client-orientation." It needed to function more as a military support operation with a lean command structure.